Another unexpected result is the negative relationship between billionaire intensity and inequality of income distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient derived from household surveys. Billionaires, it seems, prefer countries with lower income inequalities. While by definition the presence of billionaires in a country increases income inequality at the very top income pyramid, it does not increase general income inequality.
Furthermore, long-term trends in terms of billionaire intensity appear to mirror changes in income inequality within countries as measured by the Gini coefficient: an increase in inequalities before the First World War, a decrease until the 1980s, and then a new increase since then.
Number of billionaires and the relative value of their wealth
According to Forbes, the number of billionaires in the world increased from 423 in 1996 to 2,028 in 2018. In that time, the combined wealth of billionaires grew from 2.7% of the gross world product to 5.4% (Figure 1-3) . In 2018, the richest 423 people in the world (the same number as all the billionaires in 1996) each had at least $2.5 billion in wealth, which when combined equalled 4.7% of gross world product. In 1996, the countries with the highest ratio of billionaire wealth to gross domestic product (GDP) were Hong Kong, Lebanon, Lichtenstein, and Switzerland (over 10% of GDP) . In 2018, these countries remained on the list, but were joined by Cyprus, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Monaco, Swaziland, Sweden, and the United States. As Figure 5 suggests, there is a strong correlation between the wealth-to-GDP ratio in 2018 and the increase in this ratio in the preceding two decades. To express it differently, the current billionaire wealth distribution has largely emerged within the last 20 years. The Forbes list provides information on the citizenship of billionaires, but not on their residence (country of residence can change within the course of a year, and multiple times over a lifetime) and not on the second and third citizenship, so it is difficult to study migration of wealth with this data. However, it is reasonable to assume that very wealthy individuals generally have no difficulties in changing citizenship if they so desire, so the billionaire intensity indicator reflects not only the generation of wealth, but also its migration. of the national income, while in China, France, Germany, and the US it was below 15%.
The 2013 Forbes list placed Georgia and Russia ahead of other former communist countries in billionaire intensity (number of billionaires per $1 trillion purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP), followed by Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Kazakhstan ( Several others later gained passports from Malta and similar countries through citizenship for investment programs.
In 2018, only two post-communist economies had a ratio of combined wealth of billionaires to GDP that was higher than the world average (6%): Georgia (13.5%) and Russia (8%). In Georgia's case, there was only one billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili, but his net wealth of $4.6 billion accounted for 13.5% of the national PPP GDP for 2016. Other postcommunist countries were below the average ratios: the Czech Republic (5%), China (3%),
Ukraine and Kazakhstan (2% each), Poland (0.7%), Vietnam (0.3%), Romania (0.2%). because there was no income tax return system under socialism. Even today, three decades after the transition from communism, the income tax return system is not functioning fully.
But, like the Persian Gulf states, their billionaire intensity is significantly lower than in countries with some of the highest personal income taxes in the world.
Overall, if there is a relationship between tax rates and billionaire intensity, it is positive, rather than negative. In multiple regression analysis of billionaire intensity involving such determinants as quality of life and tax rates, the latter turn out to be insignificant. The reason is that safety, security, and quality of life matter more than the tax rate, and these quality of life characteristics are better generally in high tax countries. In addition, having the wealth to hire advisors skilled in exploiting legal tax loopholes means many wealthy individuals are not overburdened with onerous taxes and often manage to pay zero or very low amounts of tax.
This result is consistent with findings of other researchers. As Solimano (2018) concludes, the link between tax levels at home and offshore wealth may be tenuous, judging by the low proportion of offshore wealth held by high-tax jurisdictions like Scandinavian countries. Unfortunately, happiness is not measured in small country tax havens, such as Guernsey, Liechtenstein, and Monaco. However, in the 150+ countries for which data on happiness are available, there is a strong correlation between the happiness index and billionaire intensity, as seen in Figure 9 . After running multiple regressions on billionaire intensity and the determinants of the happiness index, it appears that some determinants, such as per capita income and social support, do not matter. The personal freedom determinant does, but it has the 'wrong' sign:
the lower the personal freedom, the higher is the billionaire intensity. The best explanatory power is the healthy life expectancy indicator, as demonstrated in Figure 10 . The best regression equation explains the billionaire intensity by the corruption index (negative impact), 1 the freedom index (negative impact), healthy life expectancy, and generosity. In one regression, social support also has a negative impact on billionaire intensity (Table 2) . *, **, *** -Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The murder rate has a predictable negative impact on billionaire intensity, but in multiple regressions this variable works only together with healthy life expectancy ( Table 2) Another unexpected result is the negative relationship between billionaire intensity and the inequality of income distribution as measured by Gini coefficient derived from household surveys. It seems billionaires prefer countries with lower income inequalities and the presence of billionaires, though it increases income inequality at the very top of the income pyramid by definition, does not increase general income inequality that is measured by surveys of representative sample households (it is safe to assume that billionaires do not participate in these surveys). Countries where the number of billionaires is considerably lower than predicted are Argentina, China, Japan, Oman, Romania, most countries of Western Europe and the Czech Republic. In 2007, for instance, China still had less billionaires than predicted by the regression and Russia had more, while the Gini coefficient in China was at the same level as in Russia (just over 40%). So, it appears that the Gini coefficient should not be taken as the ultimate measure of income inequality. The share of the total income of the richest 10% of taxpayers in China was only 30% in 2003 versus 40% in Japan (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2012) , even though the Japanese Gini coefficient at that time was way below the Chineseabout 30 and 40% respectively.
Overall, it turns out that billionaires concentrate in countries with long healthy life expectancy, low corruption, low inequalities, low freedom, and low social support, whereas the level of income and the level of taxation do not really matter.
Long-term trends in income inequalities and billionaire intensity
Long-term data suggests that inequality increased from ancient times to reach an all-time peak in the early 20th century and then declined after the First World War and the 1917
Russian Revolution.
The destruction of communal and collectivist institutions, first carried out in European countries between the 16th and 19th centuries, such as through the enclosure movement in England, and extended by colonialism beyond, was accompanied by increasing wealth and income inequality in most societies. Only during the Hobsbawm's 'short 20 th century' was the trend towards increased income and wealth inequalities interrupted. This was probably because of the greater egalitarianism present in the socialist countries where there were lower levels of inequalities (with Gini coefficients of between 25% and 30% on average) and because of the checks experienced elsewhere to rising inequalities through the growth of socialist and other egalitarian movements. But since 1980, inequality is growing again and is now close to historical highs (Jomo, Popov, 2016) .
In many countries, inequality has been approaching the levels recorded before the Second World War, which led to the emergence of the socialist bloc and the dramatic decline (2011) It is not clear where the trend in income inequalities will lead. Simon Kuznets (1955) hypothesised that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and inequality, with inequality increasing at the industrialisation stage, when the urban-rural income gap rises, and declining later with the rise of the welfare state. However, empirical research does not unequivocally support the Kuznets curve hypothesis.
In Capital in the twenty-first century, Thomas Piketty (2014) argued that the recent trend of rising national-level inequality is permanent because the profit rate is higher than the economic growth rate. For him, rising inequality is a long-term trend due to the increased wealth (capital) to output ratio (K/Y) under 'patrimonial capitalism', leading to the rising share of capital in national income. He believes this trend will continue and was only temporarily interrupted in the 20th century due to the destruction of capital during the two world wars and for other reasons. In this logic, however, it is not clear why the sustained increase in capital (versus labour) has not induced a decline in the rate of profit offsetting the effect of the growth of capital (Milanovic, 2014 ).
An alternative view, consistent with the trends noted above, is that the reversal of growing inequality followed the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the emergence of the USSR and other socialist countries, the strengthening of socialist and populist movements, the growth of the welfare state and other changes associated with Karl Polanyi's Great Transformation. After socialism lost its dynamism from the 1960s onwards and posed less of a threat, income inequalities started to grow again (Jomo, Popov, 2016) .
In 1996, there were 423 billionaires and their new worth was 2.7% of the world gross product. In 2018 the same number of richest world citizens (423), each had over $2.5 billion.
Together they had a total wealth equivalent to 4.7% of gross world product (overall there were 2028 billionaires that controlled 5.7% of the world GDP).
The recent rise in inequality has paralleled an increasing rate of profit. During the postwar Golden Age, typically, when profits were high, capital's success was shared with other social groups. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, wages, salaries, and social security benefits grew together with rising profit margins. But since the early 1980s, profit margins have increased hand in hand with rising inequalities (Jomo, Popov, 2016) .
Even though there are mounting discussions and concerns about growing income and wealth inequalities (even participants of the Davos Forum recognise growing inequality as a major risk for the world economy), these concerns have not yet materialised into practical policy measures. Economic policy in major Western countries seem to support this growing shift between the rich and the poor: marginal personal income tax rates were lowered considerably after the beginning of the 1980s.
Even though inequality appears to grow at all levels, one cannot observe rising social tensions that could be linked to growing income and wealth inequality. Countries that have the highest billionaire intensity are relatively better off than the others, have higher healthy life expectancy, higher happiness indices than others and relatively good income distribution, if several (or several dozen) billionaires at the very top are not counted. How long will this last?
Conclusion
Rich and well-developed tax havens, such as Cyprus, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Monaco, and Lichtenstein, attract many billionaires, but other less developed countries with zero or low personal income taxes (such as the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE) have relatively few.
Unsurprisingly, the happiness index is a strong predictor of the concentration of wealth in particular countries. Some determinants of the index, such as healthy life expectancy, are strong predictors of the concentration of wealth. Surprisingly, other determinants, such as per capita income and social support, do not seem to matter. Personal freedom does matter but it is a 'wrong' sign, i.e., the lower the assessment of personal freedom in a country, the higher the billionaire intensity.
The increase in billionaire intensity in 1996-2018 confirms that the rise in inequality in the past two decades occurred not only at the level of deciles and percentiles, but also at the very top. Less than 400 billionaires now control wealth equivalent to 4.7% of world gross product as compared to 2.7% in 1996. Since the 1980s, tax policies in major countries have supported these trends.
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